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1. Introduction
The assignment problem is concerned with the allocation of indivisible objects to self-
interested agents who have private preferences over these objects. Monetary transfers are not 
permitted, which makes this problem different from auctions and other problems that involve 
payments. In practice, assignment problems often arise in situations that are of great importance 
to people’s lives; for example, when assigning students to seats at public schools (Abdulkadiroğlu 
and Sönmez, 2003), graduates to entry level positions (Roth, 1984), or tenants to subsidized hous-
ing (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1998).
In this paper, we study ordinal assignment mechanisms, which are mechanisms for the assign-
ment problem that take preference orders over objects as input. As mechanism designers, we care 
specifically about incentives for truthtelling under the mechanisms we design. A mechanism is 
strategyproof if truthtelling is a dominant strategy equilibrium. Participating in a strategyproof 
mechanism is simple for the agents because it eliminates the need to take the preferences or 
strategies of other agents into account. Strategyproofness thus yields a robust prediction of equi-
librium behavior. These and other advantages explain the popularity of strategyproofness as an 
incentive concept (Pathak and Sönmez, 2008; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2009).
The advantages of strategyproofness, however, come at a cost: Zhou (1990) showed that, in 
the assignment problem, it is impossible to achieve the optimum with respect to incentives, effi-
ciency, and fairness simultaneously.1 This makes the assignment problem an interesting mecha-
nism design challenge. For example, the random serial dictatorship mechanism is strategyproof 
and anonymous, but only ex-post efficient. The more demanding ordinal efficiency is achieved 
by the probabilistic serial mechanism, but any mechanism that achieves ordinal efficiency and 
symmetry cannot be strategyproof (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001). Finally, rank efficiency, an 
even stronger efficiency concept, can be achieved with rank value mechanisms.2 However, rank 
efficiency is incompatible with strategyproofness, even without additional fairness requirements 
(Featherstone, 2020). Obviously, strategyproofness is in conflict with many other desiderata, and 
mechanism designers are therefore interested in studying non-strategyproof mechanisms. This 
highlights the need for good tools to capture the incentive properties of non-strategyproof mech-
anisms and to analyze what trade-offs are possible between incentives for truthtelling and other 
desirable properties.
In practice, non-strategyproof mechanisms are ubiquitous. Examples include variants of the 
Boston mechanism that are used in many cities for the assignment of seats at public schools,3
a rank-efficient mechanism for the assignment of teachers to positions through the Teach for 
America program (Featherstone, 2020), a mechanism for the assignment of on-campus housing 
at MIT that minimizes the number of unassigned units,4 and the HBS draft mechanism for the 
assignment of course schedules at Harvard Business School (Budish and Cantillon, 2012). It is 
1 Specifically, Zhou (1990) showed that no (possibly random and possibly cardinal) assignment mechanism can satisfy 
strategyproofness, ex-ante efficiency, and symmetry.
2 Rank efficiency (Featherstone, 2020) requires that an assignment’s rank distribution (i.e., the number of assigned 
first, second, etc. choices) cannot be first-order stochastically dominated by the rank distribution of any other feasible 
assignment. This is strictly more demanding than ordinal efficiency.
3 Variants of the non-strategyproof Boston mechanism are used in Minneapolis, Seattle, Lee County (Kojima and 
Ünver, 2014), San Diego, Freiburg (Germany) (Dur et al., 2018), and throughout the German state of Nordrhein Westfalen 
(Basteck et al., 2015).
4 Source: MIT Division of Student Life, retrieved September 8, 2015: https://housing .mit .edu/, and personal commu-
nication.
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therefore important to understand the incentive properties of these mechanisms beyond the fact 
that they are “not fully strategyproof.”
The incompatibility of strategyproofness with other desiderata in theory and the prevalence of 
non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms in practice explain why researchers have been calling 
for useful relaxations of strategyproofness (Budish, 2012).5 In this paper, we introduce partial 
strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness, which is particularly suited to the 
analysis of assignment mechanisms. Next, we illustrate the definition of partial strategyproof-
ness with a motivating example, and then we explain our main results and what they mean for 
mechanism design.
Consider a setting with three agents, conveniently named 1, 2, 3, and three objects, a, b, c, 
with unit capacity. Suppose that the agents’ preferences are
P1 : a ≻ b ≻ c, (1)
P2 : b ≻ a ≻ c, (2)
P3 : b ≻ c ≻ a, (3)
and that the non-strategyproof probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) 
is used to assign the objects. If all agents report truthfully, then agent 1 receives a, b, c with 
probabilities 3/4, 0, 1/4 respectively. If agent 1 instead reports
P ′1 : b ≻ a ≻ c, (4)
then these probabilities change to 1/2, 1/3, 1/6. Observe that whether or not the misreport P ′1
increases agent 1’s expected utility depends on how intensely it prefers a over b: If u1(a) is 
close to u1(b), then agent 1 would benefit from the misreport P ′1. If u1(a) is significantly larger 
than u1(b), then agent 1 would prefer to report truthfully. Specifically, agent 1 prefers to report 
truthfully if 3/4u1(a) ≥ u1(b) (assuming u1(c) = 0).
Our definition of partial strategyproofness generalizes the intuition from this motivating ex-
ample: For some bound r in [0, 1], we say that agent i’s utility function ui satisfies uniformly 
relatively bounded indifference with respect to r (URBI(r)) if rui(a) ≥ ui(b) holds whenever i
prefers a to b (after appropriate normalization). Fixing a setting (i.e., the number of agents and 
objects and their capacities), a mechanism is r-partially strategyproof (in that setting) if it makes 
truthful reporting a dominant strategy for any agent whose utility function satisfies URBI(r). For 
example, as we show in Section 5.1, the probabilistic serial mechanism has a degree of strate-
gyproofness of exactly r = 3/4 in the setting of the motivating example. Thus, from a market 
design perspective, we can now give honest and useful strategic advice to agents facing this 
mechanism in this setting: They are best off reporting their preferences truthfully as long as they 
value their second choice at least a factor 3/4 less than their first choice.
We argue that partial strategyproofness is a natural and useful way to think about the incentive 
properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms, and we present two main arguments 
that support this claim:
Partial strategyproofness has a compelling axiomatic motivation (Sections 3 and 4.1). We 
first prove that full strategyproofness can be decomposed into three simple axioms. Each of the 
5 Prior work has already led to some useful concepts for this purpose, e.g., the comparison by vulnerability to ma-
nipulation (Pathak and Sönmez, 2013) or strategyproofness in the large (Azevedo and Budish, 2019). We describe their 
relation to partial strategyproofness in Appendix E and Section 4.4.
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axioms restricts the way in which a mechanism can react when an agent swaps two consecutively 
ranked objects in its preference report (e.g., from Pi : a ≻ b to P ′i : b ≻ a).
1. A mechanism is swap monotonic if either the swap makes it more likely that the agent re-
ceives b (the object that it claims to prefer), or the mechanism does not change the agent’s 
assignment at all.
2. A mechanism is upper invariant if, by swapping a and b, the agent cannot affect its chances 
for objects that it prefers to a.
3. A mechanism is lower invariant if, by swapping a and b, the agent cannot affect its chances 
for objects that it likes less than b.
In words, swap monotonicity ensures that the mechanism responds to changes in the agent’s 
preference reports by increasing the assignment for the object that the agent claims to prefer, 
upper invariance essentially means that the agent cannot benefit from truncating its preference list 
(Hashimoto et al., 2014), and lower invariance is the complement of upper invariance but for less-
preferred objects. For our first main result, we show that strategyproofness can be decomposed 
into these three axioms: A mechanism is strategyproof if and only if it is swap monotonic, upper 
invariant, and lower invariant (Theorem 1). Intuitively, lower invariance is the least important 
of the three axioms (see Remark 2 for two formal arguments that support this intuition), and 
by dropping it, we arrive at the larger class of partially strategyproof mechanisms: We show 
that in a given setting, a mechanism is r-partially strategyproof for some r > 0 if and only if it 
is swap monotonic and upper invariant (Theorem 2). Thus, partial strategyproofness describes 
the incentive properties of (non-strategyproof) mechanisms that satisfy the first two of the three 
axioms.
Partial strategyproofness yields a parametric measure for “how strategyproof” an as-
signment mechanism is (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). To quantify the extent to which a mechanism 
makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy, we consider the maximal value of r for which 
the mechanism is r-partially strategyproof. We call this value the degree of strategyproofness. 
Since r-partial strategyproofness is equivalent to strategyproofness on the restricted domain of 
utility functions that satisfy URBI(r), a lower degree of strategyproofness corresponds to strat-
egyproofness on a smaller restricted domain. We prove maximality of the domain restriction by 
showing that a utility function satisfies URBI(r) if and only if truthful reporting is a dominant 
strategy under all r-partially strategyproof mechanisms for an agent with that utility function 
(Proposition 1). Thus, without additional information about a mechanism besides the fact that it 
is r-partially strategyproof, URBI(r) is the only set of utility functions for which truthful report-
ing is guaranteed to be a dominant strategy. In this sense, the degree of strategyproofness is a 
tight measure for incentive properties.
The degree of strategyproofness parametrizes a spectrum of incentive properties: Since all 
utility functions satisfy URBI(1), full strategyproofness is obviously the upper limit concept 
for r-partial strategyproofness as r approaches 1. Regarding the lower limit, lexicographic 
dominance (LD) (Cho, 2018) is the weakest among the common dominance notions,6 and the 
corresponding LD-strategyproofness is therefore a minimal notion of strategyproofness for ran-
dom assignment mechanisms. We prove that LD-strategyproofness is the lower limit concept for 
6 Lexicographic dominance is implied by trivial, deterministic, sure thing, and first-order stochastic dominance, but it 
is the only one among them under which all pairs of lotteries over objects are comparable (Aziz et al., 2013a).
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r-partial strategyproofness as r approaches 0 (Proposition 2). The degree of strategyproofness 
thus parametrizes the entire spectrum between full strategyproofness and LD-strategyproofness.
To complete the picture, we establish the formal relationships between partial strategyproof-
ness and other relaxed notions of strategyproofness from prior work (Section 4.4). For the 
assignment problem, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) used weak SD-strategyproofness to de-
scribe the incentive properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism, and Balbuzanov (2016)
used convex strategyproofness to refine their results. We show that partial strategyproofness im-
plies both notions but is not implied by either. Approximate strategyproofness (Carroll, 2013) 
and strategyproof in the large (Azevedo and Budish, 2019) are two additional notions that are 
useful in a wider range of mechanism design problems beyond the assignment problem. When 
focusing on the assignment problem, we show that partial strategyproofness implies approximate 
strategyproofness in a meaningful way and that convergence of a mechanism’s degree of strate-
gyproofness to 1 in large markets implies strategyproofness in the large. Thus, establishing that a 
mechanism is partially strategyproof immediately provides additional insights about its incentive 
properties in terms of these notions from prior work.
To illustrate the usefulness of the partial strategyproofness concept in mechanism design, we 
provide two applications (Section 5): First, it enables the strongest description of the incentive 
properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism in finite settings known to date (refining (Bo-
gomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Balbuzanov, 2016)) as well as in the limit as markets get large 
(refining (Kojima and Manea, 2010; Azevedo and Budish, 2019)). Second, partial strategyproof-
ness yields a distinction between two common variants of the Boston mechanism for school 
choice: Under the classic Boston mechanism (BM) (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003), all ap-
plications in round k go to the students’ kth choices, but under the adaptive Boston mechanism 
(ABM) (Alcalde, 1996; Miralles, 2008; Harless, 2019; Dur, 2019), students apply to their re-
spective best available school in each round. Intuitively, one would expect ABM to have better 
incentive properties than BM because strategic skipping of exhausted schools is not a useful 
heuristic for manipulation under ABM. However, formalizing this intuition is surprisingly chal-
lenging (Dur et al., 2018). Using our new partial strategyproofness concept, we can now show 
formally that ABM indeed has better incentive properties than BM: When priorities are suffi-
ciently random,7 ABM is partially strategyproof while BM is not.
Partial strategyproofness is relevant for both theory and practical applications beyond the two 
concrete examples discussed above. For theory, the simplicity of our axioms and our decompo-
sition results enable new approaches for axiomatic analysis.8 Furthermore, the parametric nature 
of partial strategyproofness enables a new quantitative analysis of the possible and necessary 
trade-offs between strategyproofness and other mechanism design objectives (see, e.g., (Mennle 
and Seuken, 2017b)). For practical applications, partial strategyproofness allows policy makers 
(e.g., school boards) to give honest and useful strategic advice to participating agents: An agent 
is best off reporting truthfully if its preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two ob-
jects; otherwise, the agent’s potential gain from misreporting may be positive but it is quantifiably 
bounded (because of the formal relationship between partial and approximate strategyproofness). 
7 Concretely, sufficiently random means that priorities must support all single priority profiles. In Remark 5, we discuss 
an approach that allows an extension of partial strategyproofness to problems with coarse priorities.
8 For example, subsequent work has already used our results to explore alternative combinations of the axioms (Chun 
and Yun, 2019; Noda, 2019; Mennle and Seuken, 2017e), to identify when truthful reporting is a strictly dominant strategy 
under the deferred acceptance mechanism (Fack et al., 2015), and to study ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in 
the random assignment problem (Dasgupta and Mishra, 2020).
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Furthermore, partial strategyproofness can be helpful to assess the extent to which misreporting 
may be a concern (e.g., by enabling mechanism designers to estimate for how many agents mis-
reporting is potentially beneficial). Therefore, we expect partial strategyproofness to become a 




A setting (N, M, q) consists of a set of agents N with n = |N |, a set of objects M with m =
|M| ≥ 2, and capacities q = (q1, . . . , qm) (i.e., qj units of object j are available). We assume 
n ≤
∑
j∈M qj (i.e., there are not more agents than the total number of units; otherwise we include 
a dummy object with capacity n). Each agent i ∈ N has a strict preference order Pi over objects, 
where Pi : a ≻ b indicates that agent i prefers object a to object b. Let P be the set of all possible 
preference orders over M . A preference profile P = (Pi)i∈N ∈ PN is a collection of preference 
orders of all agents, and P−i ∈ PN\{i} is a collection of preference orders of all agents except i. 
We assume that agents have von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions, where agent i’s utility 
function ui : M → R+ is consistent with Pi (i.e., ui(a) > ui(b) whenever Pi : a ≻ b), and UPi
denotes the set of all utility functions that are consistent with Pi .
An assignment is represented by an n × m-matrix x = (xi,j )i∈N,j∈M . The value xi,j is the 
probability that agent i gets object j . The ith row xi = (xi,j )j∈M of x is called the assign-
ment vector of i (or i’s assignment). x is feasible if no object is assigned beyond capacity 
(i.e., 
∑
i∈N xi,j ≤ qj for all j ∈ M) and each agent receives some object with certainty (i.e., 
∑
j∈M xi,j = 1 for all i ∈ N and xi,j ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N, j ∈ M). Unless explicitly stated other-
wise, we only consider feasible assignments throughout this paper. x is called deterministic if 
xi,j ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N, j ∈ M . The Birkhoff–von Neumann Theorem and its extensions (Bud-
ish et al., 2013) ensure that, for any given assignment, we can find a lottery over deterministic 
assignments that implements the respective marginal probabilities. Finally, we denote by X and 
(X) the sets of all deterministic and random assignments, respectively.
A mechanism is a mapping f :PN → (X) that selects an assignment based on a preference 
profile. fi(Pi, P−i) denotes i’s assignment when i reports Pi and the other agents report P−i . 
The mechanism f is deterministic if it only selects deterministic assignments (i.e., f : PN → X). 
Finally, given an agent i with a utility function ui who reports Pi when the other agents report 
P−i , that agent’s expected utility is Efi (Pi ,P−i )[ui] =
∑
j∈M ui(j)fi,j (Pi, P−i).
2.2. Strategyproofness and auxiliary concepts
The most common incentive concept for the design of assignment mechanisms requires that 
agents maximize their expected utility by reporting their ordinal preferences truthfully, indepen-
dent of the other agents’ preference reports.
Definition 1. A mechanism f is expected-utility strategyproof (EU-strategyproof) if, for all 
agents i ∈ N , all preference profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , all misreports P ′i ∈ P , and all utility func-
tions ui ∈ UPi , we have Efi(Pi ,P−i )[ui] ≥ Efi (P ′i ,P−i )[ui].
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Alternatively, strategyproofness can be defined in terms of stochastic dominance: For a prefer-
ence order Pi ∈ P and two assignment vectors xi and yi , we say that xi stochastically dominates 
yi at Pi if, for all objects a ∈ M , we have
∑
j∈M with Pi :j≻a
xi,j ≥
∑
j∈M with Pi :j≻a
yi,j . (5)
In words, i’s chances of obtaining one of its top-k choices are weakly higher under xi than under 
yi , for all ranks k. A mechanism f is stochastic dominance strategyproof (SD-strategyproof)
if, for all agents i ∈ N , all preference profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , and all misreports P ′i ∈ P , i’s 
assignment fi(Pi, P−i) stochastically dominates fi(P ′i , P−i) at Pi . SD-strategyproofness and 
EU-strategyproofness are equivalent (Erdil, 2014), and we therefore refer to this property as 
(full) strategyproofness.
Cho (2016) presented a substantially weaker incentive concept: Agents with lexicographic 
preferences prefer any (arbitrarily small) increase in the probability for a more-preferred object 
to any (arbitrarily large) increase in the probability for any less-preferred object; and the associ-
ated lexicographic dominance strategyproofness requires that such agents prefer to report their 
preferences truthfully.
Definition 2. For a preference order Pi ∈ P and assignment vectors xi, yi , we say that xi lexi-
cographically dominates yi at Pi if xi = yi , or xi,a > yi,a for some a ∈ M and xi,j = yi,j for 
all j ∈ U(a, Pi). A mechanism f is lexicographic dominance strategyproof (LD-strategyproof ) 
if, for all agents i ∈ N , all preference profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , and all misreports P ′i ∈ P , 
fi(Pi, P−i) lexicographically dominates fi(P ′i , P−i) at Pi .
Finally, we introduce the auxiliary concepts of neighborhoods and contour sets: The neigh-
borhood of a preference order Pi is the set of all preference orders that differ from Pi by a swap 
of two consecutively ranked objects, denoted NPi (e.g., the neighborhood of Pi : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d
contains P ′i : b ≻ a ≻ c ≻ d but does not contain P
′′
i : c ≻ a ≻ b ≻ d). The upper contour set of 
j at Pi is the set of objects that i strictly prefers to j , denoted U(j, Pi). Conversely, the lower 
contour set of j at Pi is the set of objects that i likes strictly less than j , denoted L(j, Pi). For 
example, the upper contour set of b at Pi : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d is U(b, Pi) = {a} and the lower contour 
set is L(b, Pi) = {c, d}.
3. A new decomposition of strategyproofness
In this section, we introduce three axioms and we show that strategyproofness decomposes 
into these axioms. Swapping two consecutively ranked objects in the true preference order (or 
equivalently, reporting a preference order from its neighborhood) is a basic kind of misreport. 
The axioms we define limit the ways in which a mechanism can change an agent’s assignment 
when that agent uses such a basic misreport.
Axiom 1 (Swap monotonicity). A mechanism f is swap monotonic if, for all agents i ∈ N , all 
preference profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , and all misreports P ′i ∈ NPi with Pi : a ≻ b but P
′
i : b ≻ a, 
one of the following holds:
• either: fi(Pi, P−i) = fi(P ′i , P−i),
• or: fi,b(P ′i , P−i) > fi,b(Pi, P−i).
7
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In words, swap monotonicity requires that the mechanism reacts to the swap in a direct and 
monotonic way: If the swap that brings b forward affects the agent’s assignment at all, then at 
least its assignment for b must be affected directly. Moreover, this change must be monotonic in 
the sense that the agent’s assignment for b must increase when b is reportedly more preferred.
For deterministic mechanisms, swap monotonicity is equivalent to strategyproofness (Propo-
sition 5 in Appendix D). For the more general class of random mechanisms, swap monotonicity 
is weaker than strategyproofness but prevents a certain obvious kind of manipulability: Consider 
a mechanism that assigns an agent’s reported first choice with probability 1/3 and its reported 
second choice with probability 2/3. The agent is unambiguously better off by ranking its second 
choice first. Swap monotonicity precludes such opportunities for manipulation. Nevertheless, 
even swap monotonic mechanisms may be manipulable in a stochastic dominance sense, as the 
next example shows.
Example 1. Consider a setting with four objects a, b, c, d and a single agent i with preference 
order Pi : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d . Suppose that reporting a preference for b over c leads to an assign-
ment of (0, 1/2, 0, 1/2) for a, b, c, d respectively, and reporting a preference for c over b leads 
to (1/2, 0, 1/2, 0). This is consistent with swap monotonicity; yet, the latter assignment stochas-
tically dominates the former at Pi .
Note that the misreport in Example 1 affects the agent’s assignment for a, an object that the 
agent strictly prefers to both b and c, the objects that get swapped. Our next axiom precludes 
such effects.
Axiom 2 (Upper invariance). A mechanism f is upper invariant if, for all agents i ∈ N , all 
preference profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , and all misreports P ′i ∈ NPi with Pi : a ≻ b but P
′
i : b ≻ a, 
we have that fi,j (Pi, P−i) = fi,j (P ′i , P−i) for all j ∈ U(a, Pi).
Intuitively, upper invariance ensures that agents cannot influence their chances of obtaining 
more-preferred objects by changing the order of less-preferred objects. The axiom was originally 
introduced by Hashimoto et al. (2014) (who called it weak invariance). It was one of the cen-
tral axioms in their characterization of the probabilistic serial mechanism. If an outside option 
is available and if the mechanism is individually rational, then upper invariance is equivalent 
to truncation robustness (i.e., no agent can benefit by ranking the outside option above accept-
able objects). Many assignment mechanisms satisfy upper invariance, including random serial 
dictatorship, probabilistic serial, the Boston mechanism, deferred acceptance (for agents on the 
proposing side), top-trade cycles, and the HBS draft mechanism.
Finally, our third axiom is symmetric to upper invariance but restricts how swaps can affect 
the assignment for less-preferred objects.
Axiom 3 (Lower invariance). A mechanism f is lower invariant if, for all agents i ∈ N , all 
preference profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , and all misreports P ′i ∈ NPi with Pi : a ≻ b but P
′
i : b ≻ a, 
we have that fi,j (Pi, P−i) = fi,j (P ′i , P−i) for all j ∈ L(b, Pi).
In words, a mechanism is lower invariant if changing the order of two consecutively ranked 
objects does not affect the agents’ chances of obtaining any less-preferred objects. Examples 
of lower invariant mechanisms are strategyproof mechanisms, like random serial dictatorship 
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and top-trade cycles. Constrained serial dictatorship (Noda, 2019) is swap monotonic and lower 
invariant, and deferred acceptance is lower invariant for agents on both sides.
Each of the three axioms affects incentives by preventing misreports from being beneficial 
in particular ways: swap monotonicity forces mechanisms to change the assignment for the re-
spective objects directly and in the right direction, upper invariance is essentially equivalent 
to truncation robustness, and lower invariance mirrors upper invariance but for less-preferred 
objects. In combination, they give rise to our first main result, the decomposition of strategyproof-
ness into these axioms.
Theorem 1 (Decomposition of strategyproofness). A mechanism is strategyproof if and only if it 
is swap monotonic, upper invariant, and lower invariant.
Proof. Sufficiency (⇒). Assume towards contradiction that a mechanism f is strategyproof but 
not upper invariant. Then there exists an agent i ∈ N , a preference profile P = (Pi, P−i) ∈
PN , a misreport P ′i ∈ NPi with Pi : a ≻ b but P
′
i : b ≻ a, and an object j which i prefers 
strictly to a with fi,j (P ′i , P−i) 
= fi,j (Pi, P−i). Without loss of generality, let j be i’s most-
preferred such object and fi,j (P ′i , P−i) > fi,j (Pi, P−i) (otherwise, reverse the roles of P
′
i and 
Pi ). Then fi(Pi, P−i) does not stochastically dominate fj (P ′i , P−i), a contradiction to SD-
strategyproofness. Lower invariance follows analogously, except that we take j to be the least-
preferred object for which i’s assignment changes.
By upper and lower invariance, any swap of consecutively ranked objects (e.g., from Pi : a ≻ b
to P ′i : b ≻ a) leads to a re-distribution of probability between a and b. If reporting P
′
i leads to 
a strictly higher assignment for a, then fi(P ′i , P−i) strictly stochastically dominates fi(Pi, P−i)
at Pi , a contradiction. This implies swap monotonicity.
Necessity (⇐). We invoke a result of Carroll (2012) that strategyproofness can be shown 
by verifying that no agent can benefit from swapping two consecutively ranked objects. Let f
be a swap monotonic, upper invariant, and lower invariant mechanism, and consider an agent 
i ∈ N , a preference profile (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , and a misreport P ′i ∈ NPi with Pi : a ≻ b but P
′
i :
b ≻ a. Observe that fi(Pi, P−i) stochastically dominates fi(P ′i , P−i) at Pi : By upper and lower 
invariance, i’s assignment for all objects remains constant under the misreport, except possibly 
for a and b; and, by swap monotonicity, i’s assignments for a and b can only decrease and 
increase, respectively. 
Theorem 1 highlights that strategyproofness is quite restrictive: If an agent swaps two objects 
(e.g., from Pi : a ≻ b to P ′i : b ≻ a), the only way in which a strategyproof mechanism can react 
is by increasing that agent’s assignment for b and decreasing its assignment for a by the same 
amount. The appeal of our decomposition in Theorem 1 lies in the choice of axioms, which are 
simple and easily motivated. They make the decomposition particularly useful, for example when 
verifying strategyproofness of mechanisms or when encoding strategyproofness as constraints 
under the automated mechanism design paradigm (Sandholm, 2003).9
Remark 1. While we focus on strict preferences in the present paper, Theorem 1 can be extended 
to the case of weak preferences; see (Mennle and Seuken, 2017a).
9 The decomposition has been used in subsequent work, e.g., to identify when truthtelling is a strictly dominant strategy 
under the deferred acceptance mechanism (Fack et al., 2015) and to study Bayesian incentive compatibility of ordinal 
mechanisms (Dasgupta and Mishra, 2020).
9
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Fig. 1. Illustration of uniformly relatively bounded indifference.
4. Partial strategyproofness
Recall the motivating example from the introduction, where agent 1 was contemplating a 
misreport under the probabilistic serial mechanism. r = 3/4 was the pivotal ratio between the 
agent’s (normalized) utility for its first and second choices which determined whether the mis-
report was beneficial or not. The following domain restriction generalizes the intuition from this 
basic example to agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects.
Definition 3. A utility function ui satisfies uniformly relatively bounded indifference with respect 







≥ ui(b) − min
j∈M
ui(j). (6)
If minj∈M (ui(j)) = 0 (i.e., i has utility 0 for its last choice), then Inequality (6) simplifies to
rui(a) ≥ ui(b). (7)
In words, URBI(r) requires that agent i values b at least a factor r less than a. Consider Fig. 1, 
which depicts the utility space for a setting with only two objects a and b, such that every utility 
function corresponds to a point in this figure. This allows the following geometric interpretation: 
The URBI(r) condition means that i’s utility function (e.g., the point labeled ui) cannot be arbi-
trarily close to the indifference hyperplane H(Pi, P ′i ), but it must lie within the shaded triangular 
area. r is the slope of the dashed line that bounds this area at the top. Any utility function in UPi
that lies outside the shaded area (e.g., the point labeled ũi) violates URBI(r). For convenience, 
we also use URBI(r) to denote the set of utility functions that satisfy the constraints.
We are now ready to formally define our new incentive concept.
Definition 4. Given a setting (N, M, q) and a bound r ∈ [0, 1], a mechanism f is r-partially 
strategyproof in (N, M, q) if, for all agents i ∈ N , all preference profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , all 





In words, an r-partially strategyproof mechanism makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy 
at least for those agents whose utility functions satisfy URBI(r). Note that the value of r depends 
on the setting. Since all utility functions satisfy URBI(1), 1-partial strategyproofness is equiva-
lent to full strategyproofness, and since the sets URBI(r) are nested (i.e., URBI(r) ⊆ URBI(r ′)
for r ≤ r ′), the r-partial strategyproofness requirement is less demanding for smaller r .
10
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4.1. A decomposition of partial strategyproofness
For our second main result, we prove that dropping lower invariance but still requiring swap 
monotonicity and upper invariance leads to partial strategyproofness.
Theorem 2 (Decomposition of partial strategyproofness). Given a setting (N, M, q), a mecha-
nism is r-partially strategyproof for some r > 0 if and only if it is swap monotonic and upper 
invariant.
Proof. Our three axioms swap monotonicity, upper invariance, and lower invariance are local
constraints in the sense that they only restrict how mechanisms can react to swaps. Conversely, 
full and partial strategyproofness are global constraints because they restrict reactions to arbi-
trary report changes. In our proof of Theorem 1, we have used the local sufficiency result of 
Carroll (2012) to bridge the gap between local and global constraints. To bridge the analogous 
gap in the proof of Theorem 2, we use a local sufficiency result for lexicographic dominance 
strategyproofness by Cho (2016).
It is clear that swap monotonicity and upper invariance are equivalent to LD-adjacent strat-
egyproofness (i.e., for all i ∈ N , (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , and P ′i ∈ NPi , fi(Pi, P−i) lexicographically 
dominates fi(P ′i , P−i) at Pi ). By Theorem 1 of Cho (2016), swap monotonicity and upper in-
variance are thus equivalent to LD-strategyproofness. With this, we must show the following:
Lemma 1. Given a setting (N, M, q), a mechanism f is r-partially strategyproof for some r > 0
if and only if f is LD-strategyproof.
We can restrict attention to mechanisms under which at least one agent has a direct influence 
on its own assignment; formally, there exists an agent i ∈ N , a preference profile (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , 




10 Let δ be the smallest non-zero 













i ∈ N,j ∈ M,(Pi,P−i) ∈ P
N ,P ′i ∈P,
s.t.
∣







It is easy to see that δ is well-defined and strictly positive for the mechanisms we consider.
Necessity (partial strategyproofness ⇐ LD-strategyproofness). For an agent i ∈ N and a pref-




i , P−i), then LD-strategyproofness implies that there exists some object a for which i’s 
assignment strictly decreases, and i’s assignment for all more-preferred objects j ∈ U(a, Pi) re-
mains unchanged. Since i’s assignment for a changes, it must decrease by at least δ. Let b be the 
object that i ranks directly below a in Pi . Then i’s gain in expected utility from misreporting is 
greatest if, first, i receives a with probability δ and its last choice with probability (1 − δ) when 
being truthful, and second, i receives b with certainty when misreporting. The gain is therefore 
bounded from above by
ui(b) −
(





10 Mechanisms that violate this property are trivially strategyproof for all agents and thus both LD-strategyproof and 
r-partially strategyproof for all r ∈ [0, 1].
11
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≥ ui(b) − min
j∈M
ui(j). (10)
Inequality (10) holds for all utility functions in UPi ∩ URBI(δ). Thus, if i’s utility function 
satisfies URBI(δ), then no misreport increases i’s expected utility, or equivalently, f is δ-partially 
strategyproof.
Sufficiency (partial strategyproofness ⇒ LD-strategyproofness). Let f be r-partially strate-
gyproof for some r > 0, and assume towards contradiction that f violates LD-strategyproofness. 
This is equivalent to saying that there exists an agent i ∈ N , a preference profile (Pi, P−i) ∈
PN , a misreport P ′i ∈ P with fi(Pi, P−i) 
= fi(P
′
i , P−i), and an object a ∈ M , such that 
fi,a(Pi, P−i) < fi,a(P
′
i , P−i) but fi,j (Pi, P−i) = fi,j (P
′
i , P−i) for all j ∈ U(a, Pi). Again, let 
b be the object that i ranks directly below a in Pi . Since i’s assignment for a increases, it must 
increase by at least δ. Thus, i’s gain in expected utility is smallest if, first, i receives b with 
certainty when being truthful, and second, i receives a with probability δ and its last choice with 
probability (1 − δ) when misreporting. This makes
(












> ui(b) − min
j∈M
ui(j), (12)
which holds for all utility functions in UPi ∩ URBI(r) for r < δ. Therefore, f cannot be r-
partially strategyproof for any r > 0, a contradiction. 
Theorem 2 provides an axiomatic motivation for our definition of partial strategyproofness: 
The class of partially strategyproof mechanisms consists exactly of those mechanisms that are 
swap monotonic and upper invariant, but they may violate lower invariance.
Remark 2. Two main arguments suggest dropping lower invariance and keeping swap mono-
tonicity and upper invariance as a sensible approach towards relaxing strategyproofness. First, 
on the positive side, upper invariance is essentially equivalent to robustness to manipulation 
by truncation (Hashimoto et al., 2014), and, for deterministic mechanisms, swap monotonic-
ity is equivalent to strategyproofness (Proposition 5 in Appendix D). Second, on the negative 
side, dropping either swap monotonicity or upper invariance (instead of lower invariance) does 
not admit the construction of interesting ordinally efficient mechanisms: the probabilistic serial 
mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) is swap monotonic, upper invariant (but not lower 
invariant), and ordinally efficient, and it satisfies the additional axioms symmetry, anonymity, 
neutrality, and non-bossiness. In contrast, no mechanism can be upper invariant, lower invariant, 
ordinally efficient, and symmetric; and no mechanism can be swap monotonic, lower invariant, 
ordinally efficient, anonymous, neutral, and non-bossy.11 This means that these popular combi-
nations of mechanism design axioms become unattainable when dropping swap monotonicity or 
upper invariance (instead of lower invariance).
11 See (Mennle and Seuken, 2017e) for formal definitions of these axioms and both impossibility results.
12
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Despite these two arguments, whether an axiom is more or less “important” is also a question 
of taste. We have chosen to drop lower invariance in the present paper, but investigating the 
consequences of dropping swap monotonicity or upper invariance is definitely an interesting 
research question.12
4.2. Maximality of the URBI(r) domain restriction
In this section, we study how well the URBI(r) domain restriction captures the incentive 
properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. By definition, r-partial strategyproof-
ness implies that the set URBI(r) must be contained in the set of utility functions for which 
truthful reporting is a dominant strategy. However, the two sets may not be exactly equal, as the 
following example shows.
Example 2. Consider a setting with 4 agents and 4 objects with unit capacity. In this set-
ting, the adaptive Boston mechanism with priorities determined by a single uniform lottery 
(ABMU, see Section 5.2) is 1/3-partially strategyproof but not r-partially strategyproof for 
any r > 1/3. However, it is a simple (though tedious) exercise to verify that an agent with 
utility function ui(a) = 6, ui(b) = 2, ui(c) = 1, ui(d) = 0 cannot benefit from misreport-
ing, independent of the reports from the other agents. But ui violates URBI (1/3), since 
(




ui(b) − minj∈M u(j)
)
= 1/2 > 1/3. Thus, the set of utility functions 
for which ABMU makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy is strictly larger than the set 
URBI(1/3).
Example 2 shows that, for some r-partially strategyproof mechanism, there may exist utility 
functions that violate URBI(r) but for which truthful reporting is nonetheless a dominant strategy. 
This raises the question whether URBI(r) is “too small” in the sense that it excludes some utility 
functions for which all r-partially strategyproof mechanisms make truthful reporting a dominant 
strategy. Our next proposition dispels this concern because it shows maximality of the URBI(r)
domain restriction.
Proposition 1 (Maximality). Consider a setting (N, M, q) with m ≥ 3 objects, a bound r > 0, 
and an agent i with utility function ui . Then ui satisfies URBI(r) if and only if truthful reporting 
maximizes the expected utility for i under all r-partially strategyproof, anonymous mechanisms.
Proof. Towards contradiction, assume that a utility function ũi violates URBI(r). Then
ũi(b) − minj∈M ũi(j)
ũi(a) − minj∈M ũi(j)
= r̃ (13)
for some a, b ∈ M and r̃ > r . Observe that b cannot be i’s last choice because 0/ (ũi(a) −
minj∈M ũi(j)
)
≤ r is trivially satisfied. We construct a mechanism f̃ that is r-partially strat-
egyproof but manipulable for agent i with utility function ũi , setting the assignment for the 
distinguished agent i as follows: Fix parameters δa, δb ∈ [0, 1/m]; then, for all P−i ∈ PN , all 
preference orders P̂i ∈ P , and all objects j ∈ M , let
12 In subsequent work, Noda (2019) considered the combination of swap monotonicity and lower invariance; Chun and 
Yun (2019) considered the combination of upper and lower invariance, and they independently proved the incompatibility 
with ordinal efficiency and symmetry.
13
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f̃i,j (P̂i,P−i) =
{
1/m, if P̂i : a ≻ b,
1/m + δb1{j=b} − δa1{j=a} + (δa − δb)1{j=d}, if P̂i : b ≻ a,
where d is the last choice under P̂i . For all other agents, distribute the remaining probabilities 
evenly. With parameters δa, δb ∈ [0, 1/m], this mechanism is well-defined. Next, let δb = 1/m
and choose δa ∈ [r/m, ̃r/m). It is straightforward to verify that f̃ has the desired properties 
(Lemma 2 in Appendix A). To obtain an anonymous mechanism with the same properties, we 
randomly assign each agent to the role of the distinguished agent i. This yields a contradiction 
to the assumption that i finds truthful reporting a dominant strategy under any r-partially strate-
gyproof, anonymous mechanism.
Sufficiency holds by definition of r-partial strategyproofness. 
Proposition 1 means that, for any utility function that violates URBI(r), there exists some 
r-partially strategyproof mechanism under which truthful reporting is not a dominant strategy 
for an agent with that utility function. Thus, unless we are given additional structural infor-
mation about the mechanism besides the fact that it is r-partially strategyproof (and possibly 
anonymous), URBI(r) is in fact the largest set of utility functions for which truthful reporting is 
guaranteed to be a dominant strategy.
4.3. The degree of strategyproofness
Partial strategyproofness induces a natural parameter to measure “how strategyproof” a non-
strategyproof assignment mechanism is.
Definition 5. Given a setting (N, M, q) and a mechanism f , we define the degree of strate-
gyproofness of f (in the setting (N, M, q))13 as
ρ(N,M,q)(f ) = max {r ∈ [0,1] | f is r-partially strategyproof in (N,M,q)} . (14)
Observe that, for 0 ≤ r < r ′ ≤ 1 we have URBI(r) ⊂ URBI(r ′) by construction. Thus, a lower 
degree of strategyproofness corresponds to a weaker guarantee. By maximality from Proposi-
tion 1, the degree of strategyproofness constitutes a meaningful measure for incentive properties: 
If the only known attributes of f are that it is swap monotonic and upper invariant and that 
r = ρ(N,M,q)(f ), then truthful reporting is guaranteed to be a dominant strategy for all agents 
with utility functions in URBI(r), but it is impossible to give such a guarantee for any utility 
function that violates URBI(r).
The degree of strategyproofness can be used to compare two mechanisms by their incentive 
properties: ρ(N,M,q)(f ) > ρ(N,M,q)(g) means that f makes truthful reporting a dominant strat-
egy on a strictly larger URBI(r) domain restriction than g does.14 In Section 5, we apply this 
comparison to differentiate three assignment mechanisms, namely the probabilistic serial mech-
anism and two variants of the Boston mechanism. Furthermore, in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017b) 
we have used the degree of strategyproofness to quantify trade-offs between strategyproofness 
13 To see that ρ(N,M,q) is well-defined, observe that URBI(r) is topologically closed. Thus, a mechanism that is r
′-
partially strategyproof for all r ′ < r must also be r-partially strategyproof.
14 Pathak and Sönmez (2013) proposed a concept to compare mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. As 
Proposition 6 in Appendix E shows, this comparison is consistent with (but not equivalent to) the comparison of mecha-
nisms by their degrees of strategyproofness.
14
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and efficiency that are achievable via hybrid mechanisms (i.e., convex combinations of a strate-
gyproof mechanism and a manipulable mechanism with better efficiency properties).
Observe that the degree of strategyproofness parametrizes a spectrum of incentive concepts, 
where the upper limit of this spectrum is full strategyproofness. Conversely, we would also like 
to understand what the lower limit is. To answer this question, we consider the weaker notion 
of lexicographic dominance strategyproofness (Definition 2). Recall that a mechanism is LD-
strategyproof if truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for agents who prefer any (arbitrarily 
small) increase in the probability for a more-preferred object to any (arbitrarily large) increase 
in the probability for any less-preferred object. The next proposition formalizes the upper and 
lower limits for the partial strategyproofness concept.
Proposition 2 (Limit concepts). Given a setting (N, M, q) and an r > 0, let SP(N, M, q), 
r-PSP(N, M, q), and LD-SP(N, M, q) be the sets of mechanisms that are strategyproof, r-









Proof. Towards Equality (15), observe that any utility function ui consistent with a strict pref-
erence order Pi is also contained in URBI(r) for some r < 1. A mechanism that is r-partially 
strategyproof for all r < 1 therefore makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for all utility 
functions. This implies EU-strategyproofness.
Equality (16) follows directly from Lemma 1. 
In words, Proposition 2 shows that there is no gap “at the top” between the least manipulable 
partially strategyproof mechanisms and those that are fully strategyproof, and there is no gap “at 
the bottom” between the most manipulable partially strategyproof mechanisms and mechanisms 
that are merely LD-strategyproof. The degree of strategyproofness thus parametrizes the entire 
spectrum between full strategyproofness and the minimal LD-strategyproofness.
An important consequence of Proposition 2 is that, for a fixed setting, any LD-strategyproof 
mechanism is also r-partially strategyproof for some r > 0. On a technical level, this means 
that it suffices to verify LD-strategyproofness to show partial strategyproofness. We use this in 
Section 5 to prove partial strategyproofness of the probabilistic serial mechanism. Furthermore, 
describing a mechanism as being LD-strategyproof ignores the additional information about in-
centive properties captured by partial strategyproofness, i.e., the parametric nature of the set of 
utility functions for which truthful reporting is guaranteed to be a dominant strategy under that 
mechanism.
Remark 3 (Computability). For any mechanism and any setting, the degree of strategyproof-
ness is computable. To show this, we provide a simple algorithm (Algorithm 1 in Appendix F), 
which exploits an equivalent formulation of r-partial strategyproofness in terms of a finite system 
of inequalities.15 Computability distinguishes partial strategyproofness from other concepts for 
15 Note that computability is not obvious because the definition of r-partial strategyproofness (Definition 4) involves 
infinitely many utility functions.
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which computability has not been established, e.g., the comparison of mechanisms by their vul-
nerability to manipulation (Pathak and Sönmez, 2013), strategyproofness in the large (Azevedo 
and Budish, 2019), and convex strategyproofness (Balbuzanov, 2016). However, tractability is an 
issue; we can currently only compute the degree of strategyproofness for small settings because 
Algorithm 1 considers all (exponentially many) preference profiles. In Appendix F, we discuss 
approaches towards improving tractability.
4.4. Relationships with other notions of strategyproofness
In this section, we explore the relationship between partial strategyproofness and other no-
tions of strategyproofness. Proposition 2 already established full strategyproofness and LD-
strategyproofness as the upper and lower limit concepts. In the following, we describe the 
relationships with weak SD-strategyproofness (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001), convex strat-
egyproofness (Balbuzanov, 2016), approximate strategyproofness (Carroll, 2013), and strate-
gyproofness in the large (Azevedo and Budish, 2019).
In their seminal work, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) used weak SD-strategyproofness to 
describe the incentive properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism.
Definition 6. A mechanism f is weakly SD-strategyproof if, for all agents i ∈ N , all preference 
profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , and all misreports P ′i ∈ P , the assignment vector fi(Pi, P−i) stochas-
tically dominates fi(P ′i , P−i) at Pi whenever the two assignment vectors are comparable by 
stochastic dominance at Pi .
Equivalently, this concept can be formulated in terms of expected utilities: A mechanism 
is weakly SD-strategyproof if, for all agents i ∈ N , all preference profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , 




[ui]. Observe that ui can depend on i, Pi , P−i , and P ′i , which makes this requirement 
very weak. The slightly stronger incentive concept of convex strategyproofness (Balbuzanov, 
2016) arises if ui may only depend on i and Pi but must be independent of P ′i and P−i .
Definition 7. A mechanism f is convex strategyproof if, for all agents i ∈ N and all preference 
orders Pi ∈ P , there exists a utility function ui ∈ UPi such that, for all preferences P−i ∈ P
N\{i}
and all misreports P ′i ∈P , we have Efi(Pi ,P−i )[ui] ≥ Efi (P ′i ,P−i )[ui].
Balbuzanov (2016) showed that the probabilistic serial mechanism is convex strategyproof 
and constructed a mechanism that is weakly SD-strategyproof but not convex strategyproof, 
which shows that the latter is a strictly stronger requirement.
While convex strategyproofness makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for some agents, 
the different notion of approximate strategyproofness applies to all agents but only bounds their 
potential gain from misreporting by a small albeit positive amount. However, in ordinal do-
mains, bounding these gains in a meaningful way is challenging because utilities are typically 
not comparable across agents. Nevertheless, one can formalize approximate strategyproofness 
for assignment mechanisms with the additional assumption that the agents’ utility functions take 
values between 0 and 1 (Birrell and Pass, 2011; Carroll, 2013; Lee, 2015).
Definition 8. Given a setting (N, M, q) and a bound ε ∈ [0, 1], a mechanism f is ε-
approximately strategyproof if, for all agents i ∈ N , all preference profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , 
16
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all misreports P ′i ∈ P , and all utility functions ui ∈ UPi with ui : M → [0, 1], we have 
Efi (Pi ,P−i )[ui] ≥ Efi (P ′i ,P−i )
[ui] − ε.
Finally, Azevedo and Budish (2019) proposed strategyproofness in the large, a concept which 
formalizes the intuition that agents have a diminishing benefit from misreporting as markets get 
larger. To formalize the sense in which markets get large, we follow Kojima and Manea (2010)
and consider a sequence of settings (Nn, Mn, qn)n≥1 with a constant set of objects (Mn = M), a 
growing agent population (|Nn| = n), and growing capacities (minj∈M q
n
j → ∞ as n → ∞) that 





Definition 9. For a finite set of utility functions {u1, . . . , uK } and a sequence of settings 
(Nn, Mn, qn)n≥1 with the above properties, a mechanism is strategyproof in the large (SP-L)
if, for all ε > 0, there exists n0 ∈ N such that, for all n ≥ n0, no agent with a utility function from 
{u1, . . . , uK } can gain more than ε by misreporting.16
Theorem 3. The following hold:
1. In any fixed setting (N, M, q), r-partial strategyproofness for some r > 0 implies convex 
strategyproofness and thus weak SD-strategyproofness.
Conversely, if m = 2, then full, partial, convex, and weak SD-strategyproofness are equiv-
alent; if m ≥ 3, there exists a mechanism that is convex strategyproof (and thus weakly 
SD-strategyproof) but not r-partially strategyproof for any r > 0.
2. In any fixed setting (N, M, q), r-partial strategyproofness for some r > 0 implies ε-
approximate strategyproofness for some ε < 1; and for all ε > 0 there exists r < 1 such 
that r-partial strategyproofness implies ε-approximate strategyproofness.
Conversely, for all ε > 0, there exists an ε-approximately strategyproof mechanism that is 
not r-partially strategyproof for any r > 0.
3. Fix a finite set of utility functions {u1, . . . , uK} and a sequence (Nn, Mn, qn)n≥1 with 




j ≥ n, and minj∈M q
n
j → ∞ as n → ∞. If the degree of strat-
egyproofness of a mechanism f converges to 1 as n → ∞, then f is strategyproof in the 
large.
Conversely, there exists a mechanism that is strategyproof in the large but not r-partially 
strategyproof for any r > 0 in any of the settings (Nn, Mn, qn)n≥1.
Proof. Statement 1. Observe that r-partial strategyproofness implies convex strategyproofness 
because any utility function from URBI(r) can take the role of ui in Definition 7, and con-
vex strategyproofness implies weak SD-strategyproofness. Example 3 in Appendix B gives a 
mechanism that is convex strategyproof but violates upper invariance (and therefore partial strat-
egyproofness).
Statement 2. Let f be r-partially strategyproof for some r > 0. The proof of Lemma 1 shows 
that any misreport under an r-partially strategyproof mechanism reduces the agent’s assignment 
16 The original definition of strategyproofness in the large weakens strategyproofness further by also taking an interim 
perspective, which assumes that agents are uncertain about the other agents’ reports. By omitting the interim perspective 
in our simplified Definition 9, we obtain a more demanding version of SP-L. In Theorem 3, we show in what sense partial 
strategyproofness implies this more demanding version and therefore also the original definition of SP-L.
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for the most preferred object for which the assignment changes by at least δ > 0. The mechanism 
is therefore (1 − δ)-approximately strategyproof.
By Proposition 7 in Appendix F, r-partial strategyproofness of f can be equivalently ex-
pressed in terms of the following finite system of inequalities: for all i ∈ N , (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN












































By choosing r close to 1, the last term in (18) can be made arbitrarily small. This implies a prop-
erty that Liu and Pycia (2016) called ε-strategy-proofness, which is equivalent to ε-approximate 
strategyproofness (by Theorem 1 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2016)). To see why the converse does 
not hold, refer to our proof of Statement 3.
Statement 3. Observe that any utility function ui ∈ UPi satisfies URBI(r) for some r < 1. 
Thus, we can choose r̄ < 1 large enough such that uk ∈ URBI(r̄) for all uk ∈ {u1, . . . , uK }. f is 
r̄-partially strategyproof in all sufficiently large markets because the degree of strategyproofness 
of f converges to 1 as markets get large (by assumption). Thus, in sufficiently large markets, 
truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for all agents with utility functions in {u1, . . . , uK }.
The converse does not hold: Let f be a mechanism under which an agent gets some fixed ob-
ject with probability (n −1)/n and its reported last choice with probability 1/n. This mechanism 
is 1/n-approximately strategyproof in the nth setting and therefore strategyproof in the large, but 
it is not even weakly SD-strategyproof in any setting.17 
Theorem 3 significantly expands the usefulness of the partial strategyproofness concept: First, 
given a partially strategyproof mechanism, Statement 1 shows that weak SD-strategyproofness 
and convex strategyproofness are implied. Thus, for instance, partial strategyproof of the proba-
bilistic serial mechanism (see Proposition 3 in Section 5.1) tightens prior results of Bogomolnaia 
and Moulin (2001) and Balbuzanov (2016).
Second, by definition, r-partially strategyproof mechanisms make truthful reporting a dom-
inant strategy for all agents whose utility functions satisfy URBI(r). The definition of r-partial 
strategyproofness does not rule out that agents with utility functions violating URBI(r) may ben-
efit from misreporting. However, Statement 2 shows that for those agents, their potential gain 
from misreporting is bounded and that this bound is tighter for greater r .
17 While f is a valid counterexample, it may appear artificial and inefficient. To address this concern, in Appendix B, 
we construct a mechanism that is ex-post efficient, anonymous, upper invariant, monotonic (i.e., ranking an object higher 
does not lead to a strictly lower assignment for that object), and ε-approximately strategyproof for a given ε < 1, yet 
fails to be r-partially strategyproof for any r > 0. This highlights that partial strategyproofness and approximate strat-
egyproofness are fundamentally different concepts: the former requires that there is no benefit from misreporting for a 
specific subset of the agents, while the latter requires that the benefit from misreporting is bounded for all agents.
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The connection between partial and approximate strategyproofness allows a refinement of 
the straightforward and honest strategic advice to agents who participate in an r-partially strat-
egyproof mechanism: An agent is best off reporting truthfully if its preference intensities differ 
sufficiently (i.e., the ratio between its normalized utilities for any two objects is at most r); other-
wise, the agent’s potential gain from misreporting may be positive but it is quantifiably bounded 
(by ε times the utility difference between its first and last choice). Ideally, the values of r and 
ε can be determined by the mechanism designer for a given mechanism in a given setting. We 
discuss computability of r in Appendix F; regarding computability of ε see (Mennle and Seuken, 
2016). When the exact values of r and ε are not available, upper or lower bounds may present 
a useful second best (e.g., see (Abächerli, 2017) for an analytical lower bound on the degree of 
strategyproofness of the probabilistic serial mechanism).
Finally, Azevedo and Budish (2019) developed strategyproofness in the large to identify 
mechanisms for which incentives to misreport vanish in large markets. Convergence of a mech-
anism’s degree of strategyproofness to 1 in large markets is an alternative way to formalize a 
similar idea. It is reassuring to know that, by Statement 3, both concepts are consistent in the 
sense that, if a mechanism’s degree of strategyproofness converges to 1 in large markets, then it 
is also strategyproof in the large. We use this result in our proof of Corollary 1.
5. Applications
We now present two applications of our new partial strategyproofness concept. In Section 5.1, 
we prove partial strategyproofness of the probabilistic serial mechanism. This yields the most 
demanding description of the incentive properties of this mechanism known to date, both in any 
finite setting and in the limit as markets get large. In Section 5.2, we show how partial strate-
gyproofness can be employed to distinguish two common variants of the Boston mechanisms by 
their incentive properties, a distinction that has remained elusive until now.
5.1. New insights about the probabilistic serial mechanism
The probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) is one of the most 
well-studied mechanism for the random assignment problem. It uses the Simultaneous Eating
algorithm to determine an assignment: All agents begin by consuming probability shares of their 
respective most-preferred objects at equal speeds. Once an object’s capacity has been completely 
consumed, the agents consuming this object move on to their respective next most-preferred 
objects and continue consuming shares of these. This process continues until all agents have 
collected a total of 1 in probability shares, and these shares constitute their final assignments.
The next proposition shows that PS is partially strategyproof.
Proposition 3. Given a setting (N, M, q), PS is r-partially strategyproof for some r > 0.
Proof. PS is LD-strategyproof by Theorem 3 in (Cho, 2018). Therefore, in any fixed setting, it 
is r-partially strategyproof for some r > 0 by Lemma 1. 
Regarding the incentive properties of PS, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) already showed 
that it is weakly SD-strategyproof (but not strategyproof), and Balbuzanov (2016) strengthened 
their result by showing that it is convex strategyproof. Since partial strategyproofness is strictly 
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Fig. 2. Plot of ρ(N,M,q)(PS) for m = 3 (left) and m = 4 (right) objects, for varying numbers of agents n, and evenly 
distributed capacities qj = n/m.
stronger than both properties, Proposition 3 establishes the most demanding description of the 
incentive properties of PS in finite settings known to date. 
To see what degrees of strategyproofness PS achieves, we have computed these values in 
various settings using Algorithm 1 from Appendix F. Fig. 2 shows the results. Observe that 
the values increase as the number of agents increases (while keeping the number of objects 
constant and evenly increasing capacities to satisfy demand). This suggests the hypothesis that 
the degree of strategyproofness of PS converges to 1 as the settings get large.18 In subsequent 
work, Abächerli (2017) proved this hypothesis to be true. We use his convergence result to obtain 
an elegant, parametric proof of the following corollary.
Corollary 1. PS is strategyproof in the large.19
Proof. Let (Nn, Mn, qn)n≥1 be a sequence of settings that get large as in Definition 9. Theorem 
1 of Abächerli (2017) implies that ρ(Nn,Mn,qn)(PS) → 1 as n → ∞. With this, Statement 3 of 
Theorem 3 implies that PS is strategyproofness in the large. 
The new insights about incentives under PS for both finite settings and in large markets 
highlight the usefulness of the partial strategyproofness concept. In particular, they refine our 
understanding by providing the structure of the sets of utility functions (via the URBI(r) domain 
restriction) for which truthful reporting is guaranteed to be a dominant strategy.
Remark 4. Our motivating example in the introduction considered PS in a setting with 3
agents and 3 objects with unit capacity. Recall that agent 1 could benefit from misreporting 
if 3/4u1(a) < u1(b). On the other hand, the degree of strategyproofness of PS in this setting is 
3/4 (see Fig. 2), which implies that agent 1 is best off reporting truthfully if 3/4u1(a) ≥ u1(b). 
Thus, in this setting, the set of utility functions for which PS makes truthful reporting a dominant 
strategy is exactly URBI(3/4). Similarly, in a setting with 4 agents and 4 objects with unit ca-
pacity, this set is exactly URBI(1/2). However, in a setting with 5 agents and 5 objects with unit 
capacity, an analogous statement fails to hold (see (Abächerli, 2017) for details on the settings 
with 4 and 5 agents).
18 Note that, independent of our numerical results, Kojima and Manea (2010) presented a result about incentives under 
PS in large markets, which also suggests the same hypothesis but does not imply it.
19 Azevedo and Budish (2019) first observed strategyproofness in the large for PS by invoking the result of Kojima and 
Manea (2010).
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5.2. Comparing variants of the Boston mechanism
Many school districts around the world employ school choice mechanisms to assign students 
to seats at public schools. The Boston mechanism (BM) (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) is 
frequently used in the United States. Under BM, students apply to their respective first choices in 
the first round, and schools accept applicants by priority.20 If a school receives more applications 
than it has seats, then it rejects applicants with the lowest priorities. Rejected students enter the 
second round, where they apply to their respective second choices. Again, schools accept addi-
tional applicants according to priority and up to capacity, and they reject the remaining applicants 
once all seats are filled. This process continues with third, fourth, etc. choices until all seats are 
taken or all students have been assigned.
One notable aspect of BM is that a student who has been rejected by her first choice may find 
that all seats at her second choice have been taken in the first round as well. Thus, when applying 
to her second choice in the second round, she effectively wastes one round where she could 
have competed for unfilled seats at other schools. This makes “skipping exhausted schools” an 
obvious heuristic for manipulation. A different variant, the adaptive Boston mechanism (ABM), is 
more common in Europe (Dur et al., 2018).21 Under ABM, students apply to their best available 
choice in every round. Skipping exhausted schools is therefore no longer necessary.
Intuitively, this makes ABM less susceptible to manipulation than BM. However, this dif-
ference is surprisingly challenging to formalize. Pathak and Sönmez (2013) proposed a natural 
concept for comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation, but this concept fails 
to capture the difference between BM and ABM: For the case of strict and fixed priorities, it indi-
cates equivalence, and for the case when priorities are determined by a single uniform lottery, the 
comparison is inconclusive (Dur et al., 2018). Interestingly, we can use partial strategyproofness 
to recover a meaningful distinction between BM and ABM.
To state this result formally, we require additional notation: A priority order πj is a strict 
order over agents, where πj : i ≻ i′ indicates that agent i has priority over agent i′ at object j . 
We denote by  the set of all possible priority orders. A priority profile π = (πj )j∈M ∈ M is 
a collection of priority orders of all objects, and π is a single priority profile if πj = πj ′ for all 
j, j ′ ∈ M . A priority distribution P is a probability distribution over priority profiles M , and P
supports all single priority profiles if P[π] > 0 for all single priority profiles π . A school choice 
mechanism ϕ is a mapping ϕ :PN ×M → X that selects a deterministic assignment based on a 
preference profile and a priority profile. BM and ABM are examples of such school choice mech-
anisms. Finally, for a priority distribution P, we define ϕP(P ) =
∑
π∈ ϕ(P, π)P[π]. Then 
f = ϕP is a random assignment mechanism, and it captures the strategic situation of agents 
when priorities are drawn from P.
With this, we can formalize the distinction between mechanisms BMP and ABMP.
Proposition 4. Given a setting (N, M, q) and a priority distribution P that supports all single 
priority orders, BMP and ABMP are upper invariant and ABMP is swap monotonic, but BMP
violates swap monotonicity if m ≥ 4, n ≥ 4, and 
∑
j∈M qj = n.
20 School choice mechanisms take into account priorities (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2006), which may depend on observ-
able factors (e.g., grades, siblings, walk zones) and on lotteries (e.g., to break ties).
21 See (Alcalde, 1996; Miralles, 2008; Harless, 2019; Mennle and Seuken, 2017d; Dur, 2019) for prior work that studied 
ABM.
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Proof. For all priority profiles π ∈ M , upper invariance of BM(·, π) and ABM(·, π) is obvi-
ous. Since BMP and ABMP are simply convex combinations of these mechanisms for different 
priority profiles, they inherit this property. Next, observe that ABM(·, π) is monotonic (i.e., for all 
i ∈ N , (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , P ′i ∈ NPi with Pi : a ≻ b but Pi : b ≻ a, we have ABMi,b((Pi, P−i), π) ≤
ABMi,b((P ′i , P−i), π)), and this property is again inherited by ABM
P. Lemma 3 in Appendix C





i , P−i) implies existence of a single priority profile π
with ABMi,b((Pi, P−i), π) < ABMi,b((P ′i , P−i), π). With this, monotonicity of ABM
P, and the 
fact that P supports all single priority profiles, we obtain swap monotonicity of ABMP. Exam-
ple 5 in Appendix C shows that BMP violates swap monotonicity in the respective settings. 
Proposition 4 provides a formal justification for the intuition that “ABM has better incentive 
properties than BM.” If priorities are sufficiently random in the sense that all single priority 
profiles are possible, then ABMP is r-partially strategyproof for some r > 0 while BMP has a 
degree of strategyproofness of 0.
Remark 5. Proposition 4 requires priorities to support all single priority profiles. Various exam-
ples from practice meet this requirement, including middle school assignment in Bejing (Lai et 
al., 2009), inter-district assignment to elementary schools in Estonia (Lauri et al., 2014), the sup-
plementary round of high school assignment in New York City (Pathak and Sethuraman, 2011), 
and secondary school assignment in Berlin (Basteck et al., 2018).
When priorities are coarse (e.g., based on siblings or walk-zones) or even strict (e.g., based 
on GPA or entrance examinations), Proposition 4 cannot be used directly to establish partial 
strategyproofness of ABMP. To apply the partial strategyproofness concept in these cases, and 
more generally, to mechanisms with insufficient intrinsic randomness (and even deterministic 
ones), one can take an interim perspective by considering the additional randomness that arises 
from the agents’ uncertainty about the preference reports from the other agents (see Section 2.8 
of Mennle (2016) for a formal treatment of this approach).22
To obtain some insights regarding what degrees of strategyproofness ABM achieves, we focus 
on the single uniform priority distribution U (i.e., the distribution that selects all single priority 
profiles with equal probability). Thus, for ABMU, we have computed its degrees of strate-
gyproofness in various settings.23 The results are shown in Fig. 3. Observe that ρ(N,M,q)(ABM
U)
is significantly lower than ρ(N,M,q)(PS) (Fig. 2). Furthermore, it appears to be constant as the 
number of agents increases (while keeping the number of objects constant and evenly increasing 
capacities to satisfy demand). At least for these small settings, our numbers support the intuition 
that “PS has better incentive properties than ABMU.”24
22 This interim perspective is central to the definition of strategyproofness in the large (Azevedo and Budish, 2019). In 
work subsequent to the present paper, Dasgupta and Mishra (2020) used an interim perspective to study ordinal Bayesian 
incentive compatibility of random assignment mechanisms.
23 The fastest known algorithm to compute the assignments under ABMU has exponential run-time (in contrast to 
PS, for which it is polynomial). For this reason, we have only computed the degrees of strategyproofness of ABMU in 
settings with up to 9 agents and up to 4 objects (see Remark 3 and Appendix F for a discussion of computability and 
tractability).
24 Note that we do not advocate the use of any mechanism solely on the basis of partial strategyproofness. Instead, 
such a decision must involve additional criteria like fairness and efficiency. Moreover, our results do not pertain to the 
controversy in the school choice literature that strategic reporting under the Boston mechanism can lead to ex-ante welfare 
gains (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2011).
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Fig. 3. Plot of ρ(N,M,q)(ABM
U) for m = 3 (left) and m = 4 (right) objects, for varying numbers of agents n, and for 
qj = n/m.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced partial strategyproofness, a new concept to understand the 
incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. This research is motivated by 
the restrictive impossibility results pertaining to strategyproofness in the assignment domain as 
well as the prevalence of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms in practice.
In quasi-linear domains, such as auction problems, the monetary benefit from misreporting 
can serve as a quantifiable proxy for the extent to which agents care about strategizing. How-
ever, such a proxy is more challenging to define in ordinal domains, where cardinal preferences 
are typically not comparable across agents. The partial strategyproofness concept elegantly cir-
cumvents this problem: It exploits the observation that whether an agent can manipulate an 
assignment mechanism is often driven by how close that agent is to being indifferent between 
any two objects. The URBI(r) domain restriction separates agents by this criterion. By requiring 
good incentives only on the restricted domain, partial strategyproofness relaxes strategyproof-
ness in a meaningful way and creates room for designing mechanisms that perform well on other 
dimensions.
The partial strategyproofness concept strikes a unique balance between two conflicting goals: 
It is strong enough to produce new insights yet weak enough to expand the mechanism design 
space. Regarding new insights, it allows us to provide honest and useful strategic advice to all 
agents: They are best off reporting their preferences truthfully if their preference intensities differ 
sufficiently between any two objects; otherwise, if they are close to being indifferent between 
some objects, then their potential gain from misreporting is quantifiably bounded in the sense 
of approximate strategyproofness. Regarding the expansion of the mechanism design space, we 
have demonstrated that partial strategyproofness can be applied to all mechanisms that satisfy the 
minimal requirement of lexicographic dominance strategyproofness. In particular, these include 
some of the most important assignment mechanisms, like probabilistic serial and variants of the 
Boston mechanism.
An important open question is what values of r are “high enough” to provide acceptable 
incentive guarantees. We consider this an important and interesting subject of future research. 
However, we do not believe that a universal answer to this question exists. Rather, the appropriate 
degree of strategyproofness will depend on the particular mechanism design problem at hand. 
For specific markets, it could be derived from survey data or revealed preference data (e.g., when 
preferences are expressed in terms of bidding points). Such research could be complemented by 
laboratory experiments that aim to identify the role of the degree of strategyproofness in human 
decisions to manipulate non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms.
Despite this open question, partial strategyproofness can already guide design decisions. For 
example, we can use it to compare non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms by their incen-
tive properties (as we have illustrated by applying it to PS, ABM, and BM). In addition, the 
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parametric nature of partial strategyproofness enables new quantifiable trade-offs between in-
centives and other design desiderata. For example, in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017b), we have 
used it to identify the possible and necessary trade-offs between strategyproofness and efficiency 
that can be achieved via hybrid mechanisms. Going forward, we are confident that the partial 
strategyproofness concept will be a useful addition to the mechanism designer’s toolbox and that 
it will facilitate the study of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms and the design of new 
ones.
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2 for Proposition 1
Lemma 2. The mechanism f̃ constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 is r-partially strate-
gyproof and manipulable for agent i with utility function ũi .
Proof. Observe that, under f̃ , i’s assignment is independent of the other agents’ preference 
reports, so the mechanism is strategyproof for all other agents except i. Thus, we can guarantee 
r-partial strategyproofness of f̃ by verifying that truthful reporting maximizes i’s expected utility 
for any preference order Pi and any utility function ui ∈ UPi that satisfies URBI(r).
If Pi : a ≻ b, then i’s assignment remains unchanged, unless i claims to prefer b to a (i.e., 
P̂i : b ≻ a). If a is i’s reported last choice under P̂i , then the change in i’s expected utility from 
the misreport is −δbui(a) + δbui(b) ≤ 0. If d̂ 
= a is i’s reported last choice, then this change is 
−δaui(a) + δbui(b) + (δa − δb)ui(d̂). Since δa < δb by assumption, this value strictly increases 
if i ranks its true last choice d last. Thus, i’s gain from misreporting is upper bounded by 














This bound is guaranteed to be weakly negative if δa ≥ rδb , where we use the fact that ui satisfies 
URBI(r).
Next, if Pi : b ≻ a, then i’s assignment from truthful reporting stochastically dominates any 
assignment that i can obtain by misreporting.
Finally, we need to verify that i finds a beneficial misreport if its utility function is ũi . Let 
P ′i be the same preference order as P̃i , except that a and b trade positions. The change in i’s 
expected utility from reporting P ′i is















= b is i’s true last choice. This change is strictly positive if δa < r̃δb . 
Appendix B. Examples used in the proof of Theorem 3
Example 3 (Convex strategyproofness does not imply upper invariance). Consider a setting with 
one agent i and three objects a, b, c with unit capacity. Suppose that ranking b over c leads 
to an assignment of yi = (0, 1/2, 1/2) for a, b, c, respectively, and ranking c over b leads to 
xi = (1/4, 0, 3/4). Without loss of generality, let ui be such that the utility for the last choice 
is 0 and the utility for the second choice is 1. Then i can only benefit from misreporting in the 
following two cases:
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1. Pi : a ≻ b ≻ c and ui(a) > 2,
2. Pi : c ≻ b ≻ a and ui(c) ∈ (1, 2).
The mechanism is therefore convex strategyproof but not upper invariant.
Example 4 (ε-approximate strategyproofness does not imply r-partial strategyproofness). For 
any β ∈ [0, 1], let hβ be the mechanism that collects the agents’ preference reports and then 
applies BMU (the Boston mechanism with priorities determined by a single uniform lottery) 
with probability β and applies RSD (the random serial dictatorship mechanism with the order 
of dictators determined by a single uniform lottery) with probability (1 − β). Ex-post efficiency 
of hβ follows from Theorem 2 of (Mennle and Seuken, 2017b) and the fact that BMU and RSD
are both ex-post efficient. Similarly, hβ inherits upper invariance, monotonicity, and anonymity 
from BMU and RSD (for a proof of monotonicity of BMU, see Claim 9 in Section 3.B.2 of 
(Mennle, 2016)). Next, observe that RSD is 0-approximately strategyproof and BMU is trivially 
1-approximately strategyproof. With this, hβ is β-approximately strategyproof by Theorem 2 of 
(Mennle and Seuken, 2016). Finally, Example 2 of (Mennle and Seuken, 2017b) demonstrates 
that hβ is not weakly SD-strategyproof in a setting with n = 6 agents and m = 6 objects with 
unit capacity, and hβ is therefore not r-partially strategyproof for any r > 0 in this setting.
Appendix C. Example and lemma used in the proof of Proposition 4
Example 5 (Violation of swap monotonicity by BM). Consider a setting with n ≥ 4 agents 
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , n}, m ≥ 4 objects M = {a, b, c, d, . . .}, and capacities qj ≥ 1 such that 
∑
j∈M qj = n. Let agent 1 have preference order P1 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ . . ., let agents 2 through 
qa + qc + qd have preference order P· : a ≻ b ≻ . . ., and for all objects j ∈ M\{a, b, d}, let there 
be qj agents with preference order P· : j ≻ . . .. Then BM
P
1 (P1, P−1) = (x, y, 0, 1 −x −y, 0, . . .)
for some x ∈ (0, 1), y ∈ (0, 1 − x) because P supports all single priority profiles. However, if i




1, P−1) = (x, 0, 0, 1 − x, 0 . . .). Observe that agent 
1’s assignment changes but its assignment for c remains unchanged, a contradiction to swap 
monotonicity.
Lemma 3. Given a setting (N, M, q), for all priority distributions P, all i ∈ N , all (Pi, P−i) ∈
PN , all P ′i ∈ NPi with Pi : a ≻ b but P
′












∗) = 1. (24)





i , P−i) it follows that there exists a priority pro-
file π0 with ABMi((Pi, P−i), π0) 
= ABMi((P ′i , P−i), π
0). Let ABMi,j ((Pi, P−i), π0) = 1 and 
ABMi,j ′((P
′
i , P−i), π
0) = 1, i.e., i gets j by reporting Pi and i gets j ′ 
= j by reporting P ′i , and 
let K be the round in which i applies to (or skips) a when reporting Pi .
We differentiate 6 cases, identify that the first 3 are impossible, and construct single the pri-
ority profile π∗ for the other 3:
P i:j ≻ a or P i:j
′
≻ a: Then upper invariance implies j ′ = j , a contradiction.
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j=b or j ′=a: Then monotonicity implies j ′ = j , a contradiction.
P i:b ≻ j and P i:b ≻ j
′: The fact that i gets neither a nor b when reporting Pi or P ′i means 
that both objects are exhausted by other agents at the end of round K . i thus applies to 
at most one of them and skips the other. Since i is rejected, the application process after 
round K is the same under both reports. This implies j = j ′, a contradiction.
j=a and j ′=b. Then i receives a or b in round K under the different reports, respectively. Ob-
serve that the application process before this round is independent of whether i reports 
Pi or P ′i . For all k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}, let N
k be the agents who receive their object in 
round k, and let π∗j be a priority order which, first, gives highest priority to all agents 
in N1, then all agents in N2, and so on, and second, ranks i directly after the agents in 
NK−1. Then the single priority profile π∗ where all objects have the same priority order 
π∗j is a single priority profile with ABMi,a((Pi, P−i), π
∗) = ABMi,b((P ′i , P−i), π
∗) =
1.
j=a and P i:b ≻ j
′: If b is exhausted at the end of round K − 1, then i would skip b when 
reporting P ′i and still receive a. Thus, there is still capacity of b available at the begin-
ning of round K . Let π∗ be the same single priority profile as in the previous case. Then 
ABMi,a((Pi, P−i), π∗) = ABMi,b((P ′i , P−i), π
∗) = 1.
j ′=b and P i:b ≻ j : This case is symmetric to the previous case but where the roles of a and b
are inverted.
Thus, the single priority profile π∗ exists in all cases that do not imply contradictions. 
Appendix D. Equivalence of swap monotonicity and strategyproofness for deterministic 
mechanisms
Proposition 5. A deterministic mechanism f is strategyproof if and only if it is swap monotonic.
Proof. Since deterministic mechanisms are just special cases of random mechanisms, Theo-
rem 1 applies: A deterministic mechanism f is strategyproof if and only if it is swap monotonic, 
upper invariant, and lower invariant. Thus, strategyproofness implies swap monotonicity (i.e., 
sufficiency in Proposition 5). For necessity, observe that swap monotonicity implies upper and 
lower invariance for deterministic mechanisms: If a swap (say from Pi : a ≻ b to P ′i : b ≻ a) 
affects an agent’s assignment, then the assignment must change strictly for the two objects a
and b that are swapped. But under a deterministic mechanism, this change can only be from 
0 to 1 or from 1 to 0. The only possible changes are therefore the ones where an agent re-
ceives a with certainty if it reports Pi : a ≻ b and receives b with certainty if she reports 
P ′i : b ≻ a. 
Appendix E. Comparing mechanisms by vulnerability to manipulation and degree of 
strategyproofness
The next proposition shows that the comparison of mechanisms by their vulnerability to ma-
nipulation and by their degrees of strategyproofness is consistent but not equivalent.
Proposition 6. For any setting (N, M, q) and mechanisms f, g, the following hold:
1. If g is strongly as manipulable as f , then ρ(N,M,q)(f ) ≥ ρ(N,M,q)(g).
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2. If ρ(N,M,q)(f ) > ρ(N,M,q)(g), and if f and g are comparable by the strongly as manipulable 
as relation, then g is strongly as manipulable as f .
In Proposition 6, the strongly as manipulable as relation is extended to random assignment 
mechanisms as follows:
Definition 10. For a given setting (N, M, q) and two mechanisms f, g, we say that g is strongly 
as manipulable as f if, for all agents i ∈ N , all preference profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , and all utility 
functions ui ∈ UPi , the following holds: If there exists a misreport P
′
i ∈P such that
Efi (Pi ,P−i )[ui] < Efi (P ′i ,P−i )
[ui], (25)
then there exists a (possibly different) misreport P ′′i ∈ P such that
Egi (Pi ,P−i )[ui] < Egi (P ′′i ,P−i )
[ui]. (26)
In words, g is strongly as manipulable as f if any agent who can manipulate f in a given 
situation can also manipulate g in the same situation.
Proof of Proposition 6. Statement 1. Observe that, if f is strongly as manipulable as g, then 
any agent who can manipulate g also finds a manipulation to f . Thus, the set of utility functions 
on which g makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy cannot be larger than the set of utilities 
on which f does the same. This in turn implies ρ(N,M,q)(f ) ≥ ρ(N,M,q)(g).









, and for which g is manipulable, 
but f is not. Thus, f cannot be strongly as manipulable as g, but the converse is possible. 
Appendix F. Discounted dominance and computability
In this section, we define a new dominance notion we call r-discounted dominance and prove 
that the induced incentive concept, r-discounted dominance strategyproofness, is equivalent to 
r-partial strategyproofness. We then show that this equivalence allows us to devise a simple algo-
rithm for computing the degree of strategyproofness. We also discuss computational challenges 
and potential remedies.
F.1. Discounted dominance
The new dominance notion generalizes stochastic dominance but includes r as a discount 
factor.
Definition 11. For a bound r ∈ [0, 1], a preference order Pi ∈ P with Pi : j1 ≻ . . . ≻ jm, and 
assignment vectors xi, yi , we say that xi r-discounted dominates yi at Pi if, for all ranks K ∈
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Observe that, for r = 1, this is precisely the same as stochastic dominance. However, for r < 1, 
the difference in the agent’s assignment for the kth choice is discounted by the factor rk . Anal-
ogous to stochastic dominance for SD-strategyproofness, we can use r-discounted dominance 
(r-DD) to define the corresponding incentive concept.
Definition 12. Given a setting (N, M, q) and a bound r ∈ (0, 1], a mechanism f is r-DD-
strategyproof if, for all agents i ∈ N , all preference profiles (Pi, P−i) ∈ PN , and all misreports 
P ′i ∈P , fi(Pi, P−i) r-discounted dominates fi(P
′
i , P−i) at Pi .
The next proposition yields the equivalence to r-partial strategyproofness.
Proposition 7. Given a setting (N, M, q) and a bound r ∈ [0, 1], a mechanism f is r-partially 
strategyproof if and only if it is r-DD-strategyproof.
Proof. Given the setting (N, M, q), we fix an agent i ∈ N , a preference profile (Pi, P−i) ∈PN , 
and a misreport P ′i ∈ P . The following claim establishes equivalence of the r-partial strate-
gyproofness constraints and the r-DD-strategyproofness constraints for any such combination 
(i, (Pi, P−i), P
′
i ) with x = fi(Pi, P−i) and y = fi(P
′
i , P−i).
Claim 1. Given a setting (N, M, q), a preference order Pi ∈ P , assignment vectors x, y, and a 
bound r ∈ [0, 1], the following are equivalent:





B. xi r-discounted dominates yi at Pi .
Proof of Claim 1. Sufficiency (B ⇒ A). Let Pi : j1 ≻ . . . ≻ jm. Assume towards contradiction 



















By assumption, S(m) = S(m − 1) < 0 (see (28)), so there exists a smallest value K ′ ∈
{1, . . . , m − 1} such that S(K ′) < 0, but S(k) ≥ 0 for all k < K ′. Using Horner’s method, we 
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Since ui satisfies URBI(r), the fraction 
ui(jK ′−1)
ui(jK ′ )
is bounded from below by 1/r . But since S(K ′−
1) ≥ 0 and ui(jK ′−1) > 0, we must have that
(





S(K ′ − 1)
ui(jK ′−1)
≥ 0. (33)
Therefore, when replacing ui(jK−1)
ui(jK )
by 1/r in (32) we only make the term smaller. By the same 
argument, we can successively replace all the terms ui(jk−1)
ui(jk)
and obtain





































Necessity (A ⇒ B). Let Pi : j1 ≻ . . . ≻ jm. Assume towards contradiction that Statement A
























Drk, if k ≤ K,
drk, if K + 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1,
0, k = m.
(38)































≤ −D + d. (40)




j∈M ui(j)yj is strictly negative, a contradiction. 
This concludes the proof of Proposition 7. 
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Proposition 7 generalizes the equivalence between EU-strategyproofness and SD-strategy-
proofness (Erdil, 2014). Moreover, it yields an alternative definition of r-partial strategyproof-
ness in terms of discounted dominance. This shows that the partial strategyproofness concept 
integrates nicely into the landscape of existing incentive concepts, many of which are defined 
using dominance notions (e.g., SD-, weak SD-, LD-strategyproofness, and sure thing dominance 
strategyproofness (Aziz et al., 2013a)).
F.2. Computability
The dominance interpretation from Proposition 7 enables a computational approach to partial 
strategyproofness: Recall that Definition 4 of r-partial strategyproofness imposes inequalities 
for all utility functions within the set URBI(r). This set is infinite, which makes an algorith-
mic verification of r-partial strategyproofness infeasible via its original definition. However, by 
the equivalence from Proposition 7, it suffices to verify that all (finitely many) constraints for 
r-discounted dominance strategyproofness are satisfied (i.e., the Inequalities (27) from Defini-
tion 11). This yields Algorithm 1 to compute the degree of strategyproofness of any mechanism 
in any setting (provided that the mechanism f itself is computable).
Algorithm 1: Find degree of strategyproofness.
Input: Mechanism f , setting (N, M, q)
Output: Degree of strategyproofness ρ(N,M,q)(f )
r ← 1
for all preference profiles P ∈ PN do
for all agents i ∈ N do
let j1, . . . , jm ∈ M be objects such that Pi : j1 ≻ . . . ≻ jm
for all misreports P ′
i




for all ranks K ∈ {1, . . . , m} do

























The algorithm begins by optimistically assuming r = 1. It then iterates over all possible com-
binations of preference profiles, agents, misreports, and ranks. For each combination, it checks 
whether the current r must be corrected downwards to avoid a violation of the respective con-
straint for discounted dominance from Definition 11. Specifically, we define the polynomial p(·)
to represent the respective constraint. Next, we determine the largest bound r ′ such that p(s) ≥ 0
for all s ∈ [0, r ′], and we reduce r if r ′ is smaller than r .25 This ensures that all discounted 
dominance constraints checked so far are satisfied for the current r but not for any larger values. 
Therefore, the value of r when the algorithm terminates is the degree of strategyproofness of the 
mechanism f in the setting (N, M, q).
25 Since p(0) = 0 by construction, r ′ is well-defined. Determining r ′ requires an analysis of the roots of p(·). Finding 
roots of polynomials with rational coefficients is possible in polynomial time via the LLL algorithm (Lenstra et al., 1982).
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We have used Algorithm 1 to compute the degrees of strategyproofness of PS and ABMU in a 
number of small settings in Section 5. The limited setting sizes are owed to the exponential num-
ber of preference profiles and misreports over which the algorithm iterates. This issue is further 
exacerbated by the fact that computing the assignment matrix for even a single preference pro-
file can be a computationally expensive problem for some mechanisms (e.g., Aziz et al. (2013b)
proved that computing the assignment resulting from random serial dictatorship is #P -hard, and 
for ABMU the fastest known algorithm has exponential runtime). For these reasons, Algorithm 1
is only practical in small settings and tractability may be an issue in larger settings.
To address the problem of tractability, we observe that most applications come with additional 
restrictions, such as fairness requirements, admissible types of mechanisms, or limitations on 
preference reports. Exploiting these restrictions provides avenues for future research. For exam-
ple, axioms like neutrality, symmetry, anonymity, or non-bossiness impose equality constraints. 
These constraints can be exploited to reduce the number of preference profiles that must be con-
sidered. Suppose that we restrict attention to anonymous mechanisms; then, for every preference 
profile we consider, we can skip all other preference profiles that are equivalent to the first profile 
up to a permutation of the agents.
A second approach towards improving tractability arises from local sufficiency. Even though 
full strategyproofness requires that none of the (m! − 1) misreports improve the agent’s assign-
ment, it actually suffices to verify this for the (m − 1) misreports from the neighborhood of the 
agent’s true preference order (Carroll, 2012). The same is true for LD-strategyproofness, the 
lower limit concept of partial strategyproofness (Cho, 2016). In Mennle and Seuken (2017c), 
we have shown that r-local partial strategyproofness26 implies r2-partial strategyproofness and 
that this bound is tight (i.e., r-local partial strategyproofness does not imply r2−ε-partial strate-
gyproofness for any ε > 0). Verifying that a mechanism is r-locally partially strategyproof thus 
yields a lower bound r2 on its degree of strategyproofness but only requires checking (m − 1)
misreports instead of (m! − 1).
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Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Pathak, Parag, Roth, Alvin, 2009. Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indiffer-
ences: redesigning the NYC high school match. Am. Econ. Rev. 99 (5), 1954–1978.
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